Profile | Website | STEVE LISSON | Internet | AUSTIN TEXAS | February 2015 | Directory | Review : Steve Lisson | Austin TX | February 2015: steve lisson austin tx stephen n. lisson austin texas Steve Lisson | Stephen Lisson | Stephen N. Lisson

Profile | Website | STEVE LISSON | Internet | AUSTIN TEXAS | February 2015 | Directory | Review : Steve Lisson | Austin TX | February 2015: steve lisson austin tx stephen n. lisson austin texas Steve Lisson | Stephen Lisson | Stephen N. Lisson

SEARCH | WEBSITE | STEVE | LISSON | AUSTIN | TEXAS | 2015 | INTERNET | REPUTATION: Reputation | Steve Lisson | Austin Texas | February 2015 | Directory

SEARCH | WEBSITE | STEVE | LISSON | AUSTIN | TEXAS | 2015 | INTERNET | REPUTATION: Reputation | Steve Lisson | Austin Texas | February 2015 | Directory

INITIATE PUBLICATIONS | LEGISLATIVE INFORMATION NETWORK CORPORATION (LINC) | STEVE LISSON: Search | 2015 | Website | Steve Lisson | Stephen N. Lisson | Austin Texas | Internet: Steve Lisson | Austin, TX | January 2015: Latest Profile Report Steve Lisson Website Review Internet Services

INITIATE PUBLICATIONS | LEGISLATIVE INFORMATION NETWORK CORPORATION (LINC) | STEVE LISSON: Search | 2015 | Website | Steve Lisson | Stephen N. Lisson | Austin Texas | Internet: Steve Lisson | Austin, TX | January 2015: Latest Profile Report Steve Lisson Website Review Internet Services

Matrix Bets on Wireless | Steve Lisson | Austin TX: Search | 2015 | Website | Steve Lisson | Stephen N. Lisson | Austin Texas | Internet: Steve Lisson | Austin, TX | January 2015: Latest Profile Report Steve Lisson Website Review Internet Services

Matrix Bets on Wireless | Steve Lisson | Austin TX: Search | 2015 | Website | Steve Lisson | Stephen N. Lisson | Austin Texas | Internet: Steve Lisson | Austin, TX | January 2015: Latest Profile Report Steve Lisson Website Review Internet Services

Industry Standard | Fallen VC Idols | Steve Lisson | Austin, Texas: Profile | Stephen N. Lisson | Quota | Steve Lisson | Submit | February 2015: Steve Lisson | Austin TX: Steve Lisson | Stephen Lisson | StephenNLisson | Stephen N. Lisson | Austin Texas | Austin TX

Industry Standard | Fallen VC Idols | Steve Lisson | Austin, Texas: Profile | Stephen N. Lisson | Quota | Steve Lisson | Submit | February 2015: Steve Lisson | Austin TX: Steve Lisson | Stephen Lisson | StephenNLisson | Stephen N. Lisson | Austin Texas | Austin TX

Work | STEVE LISSON | AUSTIN TX | STEPHEN N. LISSON | AUSTIN TEXAS: Search | 2015 | Website | Steve Lisson | Stephen N. Lisson | Austin Texas | Internet: Steve Lisson | Austin, TX | January 2015: Latest Profile Report Steve Lisson Website Review Internet Services

Work | STEVE LISSON | AUSTIN TX | STEPHEN N. LISSON | AUSTIN TEXAS: Search | 2015 | Website | Steve Lisson | Stephen N. Lisson | Austin Texas | Internet: Steve Lisson | Austin, TX | January 2015: Latest Profile Report Steve Lisson Website Review Internet Services

Steve Lisson

STEVE LISSON
Steve Lisson

How to rate a venture capital firm - Steve Lisson | Austin, Texas | StephenNLisson | Stephen N. Lisson | Austin Texas | January 2015









How to rate a venture capital firm - Steve Lisson | Stephen Lisson | StephenNLisson | Stephen N. Lisson | Austin Texas | Austin TX Steve Lisson, Stephen Lisson, StephenNLisson, Stephen N. Lisson, Austin Texas, Austin TX, Steve Lisson Austin TX, Stephen Lisson Austin Texas

Steve Lisson | Stephen Lisson | StephenNLisson | Stephen N. Lisson | Austin Texas | Austin TX

Steve Lisson, Stephen Lisson, StephenNLisson, Stephen N. Lisson, Austin Texas, Austin TX, Steve Lisson Austin TX, Stephen Lisson Austin Texas
How to rate a venture capital firm
By Lawrence Aragon
April 16, 2001

Red Herring explains how it came up with its list of top venture capital firms
for the 2001 version of the Red Herring 100: Kleiner Perkins Caufield and
Byers, Accel Partners, Matrix Partners, Sequoia Capital Partners, and runner-
ups Oak Investment Partners, Mayfield, Greylock, Menlo Ventures, North
Bridge Venture Partners, and Benchmark Capital.

Venture capital is like baseball without the stats. There are great arguments
about who's the best -- and worst -- VC around. But unlike baseball fans, those
who follow venture capital have scant data on which to base their opinions.

Until now.

As part of our annual Red Herring 100, we set out to determine the top ten VC
firms using the best metrics we could come up with. To our knowledge, this is
the first time anyone has come up with a list based on more than a single
metric, such as the internal rate of return (IRR).

Before we get into each of the ten factors we examined, allow us a brief
explanation as to why we didn't include the most common metric: IRR. IRR is
a number determined by each VC firm, and although it's bandied about
frequently, it can be easily tweaked to make a firm look like it's doing better
than it actually is. It isn't uncommon for a VC that isn't performing very well to
inflate its IRR by counting its own "carry," the money it makes from
investments, into its IRR.

The only real way to know how a VC firm is performing is to look at its
disbursements to its limited partners (LPs). This is the actual stock or money
that VCs get from a liquidity event -- that is, a portfolio company's IPO or its
sale to another company. The only problem is, VCs don't want to share this
information.

Enter Steve Lisson, editor of InsiderVC.com, a venture capital research firm.
Mr. Lisson has been able to infiltrate the closemouthed community of LPs and
get its members to share disbursement figures. We asked Mr. Lisson to come
up with a list of the best ten VCs in the country, based on disbursements to LPs
and how consistently they have returned the big bucks to LPs.

Here, then, are the top ten venture capital firms: Kleiner Perkins Caufield &
Byers, Accel Partners, Matrix Partners, Sequoia Capital Partners, Oak
Investment Partners, Mayfield, Greylock, Menlo Ventures, North Bridge
Venture Partners, and Benchmark Capital. The top four firms (the first four
listed) made it into the Red Herring 100. Now, on to our criteria: underneath
the chart just below we review in depth the ten factors we rated the companies
on.

1. Kleiner Perkins Caufield &
Byers 10 10 10 6 10 9 10 5 10 109.09
2.Accel Partners 9 9 8.58 10 9 9 5 10 108.77
3. Matrix Partners 9 10 10 9 5 10 10 10 4 6 8.36
4. Sequoia Capital Partners 6 10 9.5 8 10 7.5 10 5.5 2 4 7.14
(tied) Oak Investment
Partners 8 10 6.5 10 2 5 10 7 2 107.14
(tied) Mayfield 7 10 9.5 7 10 8 10 6 0 4 7.14
7. Greylock 6 10 10 9 4 9 10 7 6 0 7.00
8. Menlo Ventures 8 10 5.5 8 3 10 6.5 7.5 2 2 6.41
9. North Bridge Venture
Partners 7 3.5 10 7 6 9 8 9.5 0 2 6.27
10. Benchmark Capital 7 3 6.5 7 3 8 1 4 10 2 5.32
Average7.7 8.55 8.6 7.9 6.3 8.45 8.45 6.65 4.6 5 7.26

1 The disbursement category is weighted twice that of other categories. Data from Steve Lisson,
editor of InsiderVC.com.
2 Operating experience counts VP level and above.


Disbursements.

Mr. Lisson gave a score of 10 to just one VC firm: Kleiner Perkins Caufield &
Byers. Benchmark Capital, which has had some monster hits in the past couple
of years, scored a 7, because it has only been around for six years.

Longevity.

In the venture business, age counts for a lot. It means a firm has been battle-
tested and has done well enough to get its LPs to continue investing. We took
each firm's number of years in business and divided that figure in half to come
up with a score (with a maximum score of 10). Six firms earned a 10. Two firms
came up short: Benchmark and North Bridge Venture Partners, with scores of
3 and 3.5, respectively.

Pressure to invest.

A general partner is better off if there isn't pressure to put a lot of money to
work. We divided the amount of a firm's current fund size by its number of
general partners, then assigned a value to the resulting figure. After talking to
several VCs, we determined that $90 million per partner was reasonable to
assign a score of 10. We gave a 9 to anyone managing $110 million, an 8 to
those managing $130 million, and so on.

VC experience.

This should be self-explanatory as to why it's important. We gave general
partners with 15 years or more of experience a score of 10. Those with 12 to 14
years received a 9, and so forth. Oak Investment Partners came out on top in
this category, with an average of 17 years for its partners. Even though Kleiner
has at least three partners with more than 20 years of experience, its score got
knocked down to a 7 because it recently added some technology executives to
its partnership.

Operating experience.

With so many portfolio companies in trouble these days, every VC firm needs
partners who've been in the real world to advise troubled companies. We gave
each firm a point for any general partner with operating experience, plus a
bonus point for any partner who qualified as a "star." General partners who fell
into the star category include Kleiner's Ray Lane, former president and chief
operating officer (some say the de facto CEO) of Oracle, and Mayfield's Janice
Roberts, who ran Palm when it was a division of 3Com.

Board seats.

Six boards is the maximum number you can sit on and still actually contribute
valuable time and energy, we're told by veteran VCs. Menlo Ventures and
Matrix Partners were the only firms whose partners sat on an average of six or
fewer boards, giving them perfect 10s. We gave firms whose partners held an
average of seven to eight board seats a score of 9, and so on. Oak fared the
worst: its six general partners sit on an average of 12 boards each.

IPOs/Sales.

This is one of those categories that VCs like to brag about, but it can often be
misleading. Two firms may be in the same IPO, but one may own 15 percent of
a company while another owns 1 percent. The only real way to know how well a
VC did in an IPO is through disbursement figures. Still, we felt we should give
VCs some credit for liquidity events. We gave a firm one point for every $1
billion in value, with a maximum of 10 points for $10 billion. IPO figures were
based on the close on the first day of trading. Sale prices were based on the
value on the day the deal closed. A lot of moonshot IPOs have fallen back to
earth, so this category is squishy at best.

Lack of portfolio problems.

Matrix was the only firm on our list that had no failed or troubled companies.
We gave each firm 1 point for every failed company and half a point for every
company that had laid off employees in the past year. We then subtracted that
total from 10. Benchmark fared the worst in this category with a score of 4.
Blame it on those Internet bets like Living.com, MVP.com, and Send.com.

RH 100 factor (2000 and 2001).

VCs deserve credit for portfolio companies that show great promise. Because
the staff of Red Herring spent weeks vetting all of the companies that made the
Red Herring 100 list, we used the private portion of the list (50 companies) in
2000 and 2001 as a basis for determining potential hits. For every portfolio
company on the Red Herring 100, we gave a firm 2 points, with a maximum of
10. Kleiner and Accel Partners were the only firms to receive 10s for both years.
Kleiner had the most companies on this year's list: Zaplet, Epoch, Synaptics,
SmartPipes, Asera, and Bowstreet.

As much time as we spent thinking about how to create a top ten VC list, and
then double- and triple-checking the data, we'd be nave if we didn't expect
some VCs to take issue with our numbers or our methodology. So, don't feel
shy about expressing your opinion.

Write to laragon@redherring.com.

Note: In the "Top 10 VC Firms" on page 185 of issue 97, Menlo Ventures
should have been ranked No. 8 and North Bridge Ventures should have been
No. 9. In addition, we did not make it clear that three firms tied for 4th place:
Sequoia Capital Partners, Oak Investment Partners, and Mayfield. The data
is correct here.

SPONSORED LINKS


ABOUT US


TERMS OF SERVICE
ETHICS POLICY
HELP
Copyright 2003 RHC Media, Inc.

www.redherring.com


Steve Lisson | Stephen Lisson | StephenNLisson | Stephen N. Lisson | Austin Texas | Austin TX

Steve Lisson, Stephen Lisson, StephenNLisson, Stephen N. Lisson, Austin Texas, Austin TX, Steve Lisson Austin TX, Stephen Lisson Austin Texas


NVCA Advocates More Confidentiality on Returns | Steve Lisson | Austin, TX | January 2015









Steve Lisson | Stephen Lisson | StephenNLisson | Stephen N. Lisson | Austin Texas | Austin TX

Steve Lisson, Stephen N. Lisson, Austin, Travis County, Texas
Steve Lisson, Stephen Lisson, StephenNLisson, Stephen N. Lisson, Austin Texas, Austin TX, Steve Lisson Austin TX, Stephen Lisson Austin TexasSteve Lisson | Stephen Lisson | StephenNLisson | Stephen N. Lisson | Austin Texas | Austin TX
The Private Equity Analyst WEEKLY Page 6 of 7 NOVEMBER 12, 2001
MARKET INTELLIGENCE
NVCA Advocates More Confidentiality on Returns By Sree Vidya Bhaktavatsalam
Could it be a coincidence that GPs are getting touchier on the
issue of confidentiality of fund performance data at a time when
private equity returns are plummeting?
The National Venture Capital Association recently distributed
a list of suggestions for GPs to reduce unwanted
disclosure of information included in reports to their LPs,
particularly public pension funds, presumably to spare GPs the
shock of seeing their fund returns posted on a Web site or in a
trade press article.
Many state, municipal and local pension funds have fair
disclosure regulations, which, in the interest of transparency,
may require that the information be made available to the
public. NVCA's suggestions include entering into confidentiality
agreements with LPs and tailoring the data distributed to
minimize the "harmful effects of subsequent public disclosure."
Advocates for keeping performance data confidential
argue that the private equity industry relies on imperfect
information about private companies, which can be too
sensitive to reveal to the public. Also, they say that in the
absence of any standardized method of reporting private equity
returns, performance data presented in the form of IRRs can be
inaccurate and misleading.
President Mark Hessen of the NVCA says his concern is
that individuals (reporters, for example, or retirees whose public
pension program is used to invest in private equity funds) may
not be well-versed in the intricacies of performance data and
thus will get a distorted view of overall fund returns by looking
at quarterly reported returns.
'A quarterly perspective is not representative of the entire
fund,' he says. "We need to educate the public before we can
throw this information out there."
Still, some like Michael Smith, director of research at
Atlanta-based consulting firm Hewitt Investment Group, believe
that transparency is the only way for prospective
Sources of private equity fund performance data
Venture Economics, Newark, N.J.: A division of
Thomson Financial. Provides industry wide private
equity performance benchmarks. Reach the firm at 973-
622-3100.
Cambridge Associates, Boston: Provides private
equity performance benchmarks and consulting services.
Reach the firm at 617-457-7500.
InsiderVC.com. Austin, Texas: Provides performance
data on individual venture capital firms. Its Web
site is at www.insidervc.com.
investors to separate "the wheat from the chaff.
"This is a market that two years ago did not need new
quality institutional investors," he says. "Clearly that is different
now-if (VCs) want to broaden their appeal, the way to do it is by
making it more transparent."
NVCA's suggestions come at a time when GPs are still
smarting from California Public Employees' Retirement
System's decision earlier this year to post fund performance
data on its website. Calpers posted the IRRs of the 163
partnerships it had invested in since 1990, and had downgraded
some firms as "not performing up to expectations." (See Private
Equity Analyst Weekly, June 4, page 5.) A few months later,
Calpers yanked the returns data from its Web site, after receiving
complaints from its GPs.
So, how can prospective investors gain access to the
performance data of venture capital and private equity firms?
Some public pension funds do make their quarterly performance
reports available to the public as a matter of course. Others,
like Florida State Board of Administration, make information
available, if the public requests it. And then there are quarterly
benchmark numbers for the whole industry released by Venture
Economics and Cambridge Associates. (See table below.)
One source of fund performance data is the Web site
InsiderVC.com, whose founder, Stephen Lisson, has received
both brickbats and bouquets from venture capitalists for his
analysis of performance data and his provocative commentary.
His Web site provides performance data of hundreds of venture
capital and private equity funds including those managed by
New Enterprise Associates and Matrix Partners.
In an interview, Mr. Lisson declined to reveal his sources
of information. "The reason people share information with us is
that we are very discreet, and we are very careful about who
sees our information." Indeed, Mr. Lisson carefully screens
applicants before allowing them to subscribe to the performance
data contained in his Web site.
Mr. Lisson stresses that his data is not intended for the general
public. "My data is for insiders to improve their own game. VCs get to
benchmark themselves against their peers-it's a confidence level
thing," Mr. Lisson says. Mr. Lisson acknowledges that the VC
community could benefit from a healthy dose of transparency and
humility. "Sunlight is the best disinfectant," he says. But he questions
the value of making public IRRs and interim valuations, which by
nature are based on subjective evaluations. "There should be less
focus on returns and interim valuations, and more focus on building
world class companies."
Copyright 2001 Asset Alternatives, Wellesley, Mass.


Steve Lisson, Stephen N. Lisson, Austin, Travis County, Texas
Steve Lisson, Stephen Lisson, StephenNLisson, Stephen N. Lisson, Austin Texas, Austin TX, Steve Lisson Austin TX, Stephen Lisson Austin TexasSteve Lisson | Stephen Lisson | StephenNLisson | Stephen N. Lisson | Austin Texas | Austin TX

Steve Lisson, Stephen N. Lisson, Austin, Travis County, Texas



DECEMBER 2014 Elite VC giants still investing | Steve Lisson | Stephen Lisson | StephenNLisson | Stephen N. Lisson | Austin Texas | Austin TX

JANUARY 2015





















STEVE.LISSON, STEVE LISSON, STEPHEN LISSON, STEPHAN N. LISSON, STEPHAN LISSON, LISSON STEPHAN, AUSTIN, TX, TEXAS, STEPHEN N. LISSON, TRAVIS COUNTY, TEXAS, LISSON STEPHEN N., STEVE N. LISSON, STEVE, LISSON, INSIDER, VC, INSIDERVC, INSIDERVC.COM, (512), STEPHEN.LISSON, FACEBOOK, LINKEDIN, LINKED IN, TWITTER,



STEVE.LISSON, STEVE LISSON, STEPHEN LISSON, STEPHAN N. LISSON, STEPHAN LISSON, LISSON STEPHAN, AUSTIN, TX, TEXAS, STEPHEN N. LISSON, TRAVIS COUNTY, TEXAS, LISSON STEPHEN N., STEVE N. LISSON, STEVE, LISSON, INSIDER, VC, INSIDERVC, INSIDERVC.COM, (512), STEPHEN.LISSON, FACEBOOK, LINKEDIN, LINKED IN, TWITTER,

Elite VC giants still investing

San Jose Mercury News
Matt Marshall
May 31, 2001

Now that they've gone gorilla size, will the elite venture capital firms help stem the downturn in venture capital investing?

After the March 2000 market crash, elite VCs scrambled to triage their portfolios. Only recently have they started to peer out of the graveyard.

But they've undergone a profound change in nature: They've become monsters. This is good if you're an entrepreneur shooting for the moon. It's fatal if not.

In 1995, only one top-tier fund, TA Associates, had raised a billion dollars. But since the crash, 15 top-tier firms have raised funds of that size or more. Many -- including Worldview Technology Partners, Greylock, Austin Ventures and Oak Investment Partners -- announced their new funds this year, well after most of the market damage.

Steve Lisson, of InsiderVC.com, says the amount of funds raised since the crash goes against the "drought" thesis.

"The perception that there's going to be less venture investing is totally misplaced," he says. "These VCs need to get into lucrative investment opportunities, and they're going to want larger stakes. They're going to have to step on the gas even more."

Similarly, he adds, if an entrepreneur offers an opportunity for a "mega" investment, he'll be able to negotiate more favorable terms, because the big venture capitalists will all want in. On the downside, entrepreneurs that don't show home-run promise will struggle.

True, some VCs that raised large funds say they have slowed their investment pace. Flip Gianos, partner at InterWest Partners, said his firm hadn't expected the magnitude of the downturn when it raised its fund. If it takes waiting a year for strong opportunities to come along, VCs will wait, he says.

Others counter that size has forced them to invest more in later-stage start-ups because they soak up more money. Michael Darby, general partner at Battery Ventures, says his firm still focuses on early stage deals, but "in this environment, the fact that we want to deploy capital means we're looking at those later-stage deals."

There's another reason for hope after the crash, Lisson says. Many VC firms have been able to negotiate stellar terms with their investors -- even better than those they negotiated just a couple of years ago. That's also a sign that investors still have faith in the VCs, he said.

Steve Lisson | Stephen Lisson | StephenNLisson | Stephen N. Lisson | Austin Texas | Austin TX

Steve Lisson, Stephen Lisson, StephenNLisson, Stephen N. Lisson, Austin Texas, Austin TX, Steve Lisson Austin TX, Stephen Lisson Austin Texas

Steve Lisson | Stephen Lisson | StephenNLisson | Stephen N. Lisson | Austin Texas | Austin TX

STEVE.LISSON, STEVE LISSON, STEPHEN LISSON, STEPHAN N. LISSON, STEPHAN LISSON, LISSON STEPHAN, AUSTIN, TX, TEXAS, STEPHEN N. LISSON, TRAVIS COUNTY, TEXAS, LISSON STEPHEN N., STEVE N. LISSON, STEVE, LISSON, INSIDER, VC, INSIDERVC, INSIDERVC.COM, (512), STEPHEN.LISSON, FACEBOOK, LINKEDIN, LINKED IN, TWITTER,













http://stevenlisson.wordpress.com/2014/07/11/httpssites-google-comsitestephannlissonaustinhttp-stephannlissonaustin-blogspot-com-2014-07-httpstephennlissonpdfblogspotcom201311m-html/

https://sites.google.com/site/stephannlissonaustin/http-stephannlissonaustin-blogspot-com-2014-07-httpstephennlissonpdfblogspotcom201311m-html


 

http://stephannlissonaustin.blogspot.com/2014/07/httpstephennlissonpdfblogspotcom201311m.html

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thursday, July 10, 2014

http://stephennlissonpdf.blogspot.com/2013/11/matrix-edges-kleiner.html

 
 
 
 
 
 


 
2014  Steve Lisson Austin TX Stephen N. Lisson Austin TX Steve Lisson Austin Texas Stephen N. Lisson Austin Texas
 
Matrix Edges Kleiner
by Paul Shread
January 29, 2001–Kleiner Perkins Caufield & Byers and Matrix Partners are considered the cream of the crop among venture capital firms, the kind of VCs that limited partners are fortunate to be able to invest their money with.
So compliments paid, we set out to find out which was better.
Using the data of Steve Lisson, editor of InsiderVC.com, who tracks VCs’ performance and considers Matrix and Kleiner the top VCs, we applied a metric suggested by former Flatiron partner Dan Malven, which we will call the “Malven Metric.”
Malven suggested the metric after our piece comparing Kleiner’s performance in the IPO market last year with four other firms. In short, we divide overall performance by the number of partners, thus measuring wealth created per partner.
Malven cautions that that measure of performance could be skewed if each partner at one firm has a lot more to invest than partners at another firm, but Kleiner and Matrix appear pretty evenly matched. Matrix IV in 1995 was a $125 million fund (and had distributed 11 times that amount to its limited partners by the middle of last year, according to Lisson), and Matrix V in 1998 was a $200 million fund that had already distributed four times its LPs’ capital by mid-2000. Using the conservative figure of five partners during the time that 2000 IPOs were being funded, that means Matrix partners had $65 million each to work with. (We did not include Matrix VI, a $304 million fund that was only 30% invested as of June 30 last year.)
Kleiner VIII in 1996 was a $299 million fund that had returned 12 times its LPs’ capital by mid-2000, according to Lisson. Kleiner IX in 1999 was a $460 million fund that was 80% invested by mid-2000. Using the conservative figure of 13 partners, Kleiner partners had $58 million each to work with.
Now on to the 2000 results. Ten of Kleiner’s companies went public in 2000 (0.77 IPO per partner), compared to 4 for Matrix (0.80 IPO per partner). Kleiner’s stake in those companies was worth about $2.3 billion when the lock-up period expired (one company, Cosine Communications, is still in lock-up, and Kleiner’s stake in the company is worth about $100 million). Matrix’s stake in its four IPOs was worth about $1.6 billion when they came out of lock-up. That gives Matrix a per-partner return of $320 million, and Kleiner $177 million, giving the edge in per-partner wealth creation to Matrix.
A few caveats on those results. First, we measured performance in the IPO market only; we did not look at acquisitions, the number of which often exceeds IPOs in a given year. Second, Kleiner has two health care partners, according to Malven. Since health care companies had a tough year in the IPO market last year (Kleiner had no health care IPOs), reporting the results based on IT partners only raises Kleiner’s per-partner wealth creation to $209 million. We certainly want our top VCs to focus on the future of health care regardless of market conditions, and there’s been quite a debate going on within the venture capital industry about IT versus health care investing. The third caveat is that Kleiner IX is the newest of the funds measured, so that too could give Matrix an edge. But don’t feel too bad for Kleiner; according to Lisson, 6-year-old Kleiner VII was the best-performing venture fund last year, still riding high on its monster hit Juniper Networks (NASDAQ:JNPR). That fund has returned more than 20 times its limited partners’ capital.
Matrix’s big hit of 2000 was Arrowpoint Communications, which netted Matrix $1 billion when it was acquired by Cisco (Nasdaq:CSCO) in June. Kleiner had holdings in three IPOs that were worth $500 million or more when they came out of lock up: ONI Systems (Nasdaq:ONIS), Handspring (Nasdaq:HAND) and Corvis (Nasdaq:CORV).
It’s not clear when or if the VCs sold shares in the IPOs. Cisco’s stock, for example, has declined almost 40% since the Arrowpoint deal closed. Kleiner’s biggest winners have held their value since the lock-up period expired, but both companies had holdings that declined substantially from their lock-up expiration price.
Both firms also had about $2 billion each in 1999 IPOs that came out of lock-up in 2000, giving Matrix the “Malven Metric” edge there too.
But as Lisson pointed out, “This is splitting hairs amidst the pinnacle of the field. A fun, interesting and worthwhile analysis, but the distinction makes no difference to investors in these funds. The amounts of money involved are trivial when viewed in context, the venture capital segment in the alternatives portion of an entire portfolio. Nonetheless, the LPs of both Kleiner and Matrix can thank their lucky stars to be in these funds. It is amazing how these and a few other elite firms can put so much distance between themselves and the rest of field, repeatedly, in bad times as well as good.”
And finally, a follow-up to last week’s column on Summit Partners, the most recent firm to join the elite $2 billion fund club. Lisson had this to say of Summit: “As a private equity investor, Summit can outperform some early-stage VCs, the reverse of how it’s supposed to work. Now that’s a firm where unquestionably ‘there’s something in the water’ consistently over the years.”
Corey Ostman of Alert-IPO and Mary Evelyn Arnold of VC Buzz provided research for this article.
Steve Lisson Austin TX Stephen N. Lisson Austin TX Steve Lisson Austin Texas Stephen N. Lisson Austin Texas
 
   
Simple template. Powered by Blogger.
 
 

Friday, June 27, 2014


Steve Lisson

 

Sunday, June 15, 2014


http://behindthevcmusic.blogspot.com/

 
 
 
 
 
 

Steve Lisson Austin TX Stephen N. Lisson Austin Texas

Steve Lisson Austin TX Stephen N. Lisson Austin Texas
 
 
 
 
 
 

Tuesday, February 18, 2014


Stephen N. Lisson

 

Monday, January 27, 2014


http://austintexascourt.wordpress.com/

 

Stephen N. Lisson

Steve Lisson, Stephen Lisson, Austin Texas

Standard
Posted by austintexascourt
Posted on January 25, 2014
Posted under Uncategorized
Comments Leave a Comment

Steve Lisson Austin TX




Stephen N. Lisson

Steve Lisson, Stephen Lisson, Stephen N. Lisson, Austin Texas

Saturday, January 25, 2014


Stephen Lisson

Stephen N. Lisson

Steve Lisson, Stephen Lisson, Stephen N. Lisson, Austin Texas

Saturday, January 25, 2014

Subscribe to: Posts (Atom)
   
Simple template. Powered by Blogger.
Subscribe to: Posts (Atom)
   
Simple template. Powered by Blogger.


Standard
Posted by austintexascourt
Posted on January 25, 2014
Posted under Uncategorized
Comments Leave a Comment

Steve Lisson

Follow

Follow “Stephen N. Lisson”

Get every new post delivered to your Inbox.


Sunday, November 24, 2013


Steve Lisson, Stephen N. Lisson

 
VALLEY TALK
Behind the VC Music
FORTUNE
Wednesday, November 22, 2000
By Mark Gimein

Stephen Lisson is not a conventionally likable guy. On more
than one occasion, he’s implied that I’m the single stupidest
reporter he’s ever talked to. He has kept me on the phone for
hours at a time listening to the most arcane statistics, until I’ve
slammed down the phone in frustration. He calls people who
disagree with him “lickspittles.” He dismisses many of the
visitors to his Website as “parasites.”

And yet over the past few months I have repeatedly gone back to
Lisson and his new Website, InsiderVC.com, because Lisson has
the best data out there about venture capital, and often the most
interesting things to say about it.

Venture capitalists are the rock stars du jour of the financial
world, a species of money managers who are believed capable of
superhuman wisdom. Business magazines tend to assume that
the richer you are, the smarter you must be, and the Internet
boom has lavished untold riches on the venture capitalists who
invested early.

“Untold” is a key word here, because hardly anyone knows
exactly how great these riches are. In this way, venture-capital
funds are very different from, say, mutual funds. Venture
capitalists talk vaguely about “triple-digit returns,” but even
successful funds tend to keep their returns a closely guarded
secret. And even when they do reveal numbers, they can be hard
to understand.

This is where Austin, Texas, entrepreneur and venture-capital
gadfly Stephen Lisson comes in. Through years of research and,
apparently, a lot of cooperation from a network of sources
willing to send him copies of the reports that venture-capital
firms send out to their investors, Lisson has gathered an
immense database of information about venture-capital firms’
investments and profits.

Lisson doesn’t make all his data public–much of his information
is limited to subscribers, and he can be picky even about whom
he allows to subscribe. But what he’s already revealed in the
public sections (for example, see: Database Example) of
InsiderVC.com is fascinating. Some of his data shows exactly
what you might expect. Benchmark Capital Partners’ 1995 fund-the
fund that famously invested in eBay–has already returned to
its investors 38 times the money they put in. Investors who put
money into the fund that Kleiner Perkins Caufield & Byers,
Silicon Valley’s best-known venture-capital firm, raised in 1996,
have already made a similarly spectacular return of over 1,000%.

But you’ll also find that the 1997 fund raised by Hummer
Winblad, another venture-capital firm that has traditionally
received a lot of attention from the press, has so far returned
only 42% of its investors’ money. That might be a decent
showing in any other era, but in the middle of the biggest
technology boom or bubble in history, it’s not great, and not
nearly as good as some of Hummer Winblad’s peers. (Typically,
venture funds distribute cash or stocks as the companies in their
portfolio are sold or go public. In theory, that means they can
continue paying out money to investors for a very long time, but
in practice, almost all of their profits are made in the first six
years of the fund.)

Even more interesting are the data that Lisson has gathered on
how venture capitalists value their investments. Venture
capitalists measure their own performance by an “internal rate of
return”–an annualized rate of increase in the value of their
investments. Often that’ll be a number in the high double digits,
sometimes in the triple digits. Sounds pretty good when you
compare it with the typical mutual fund. But if you look at the
InsiderVC.com database, you’ll find that funds claiming
immense annual returns sometimes pay out a lot less money to
investors than you’d imagine.

As of March 2000, Benchmark claimed an annualized return of
an amazing 279% for Benchmark III, the fund that the firm
raised in 1998. But wait a second! Lisson’s data also show that
Benchmark III hadn’t actually distributed any cash or stock to its
investors. That 279% return was based on a guesstimate of the
value of the companies Benchmark has invested in–companies
that, since they hadn’t gone public, are notoriously hard to value.
One of those companies, Living.com, has already gone bankrupt,
reducing the value of Benchmark’s investment from an estimated
$74 million to zero. And it’s hard to believe that, with the Net
bubble bursting, Benchmark’s investment in eBags.com is really
worth the $20 million-plus that Benchmark valued it at in
March.

For individual investors who don’t have a prayer of putting their
money into funds that deal only with tech insiders, large
institutions, and foundations, analyzing exactly how much the
top funds make can certainly seem like an academic exercise. It
can all sound arcane, confusing, and dull, and if you are not an
investor in venture-capital funds, I don’t recommend it as a
hobby or a business. But it’s important that somebody do it.
First, because venture investment is the engine driving much of
Silicon Valley’s technological innovation. And, second, because
it’s important for somebody like Lisson to remind investors and
the business press that venture capitalists are not the gods of
finance they are often made out to be, but instead, very well-
trained money managers. Sometimes very smart money
managers, sometimes very lucky money managers, but
nonetheless, financiers who’ll often make a lot of money and
sometimes, like the rest of us, flub it.

HOME | COMPANY PROFILES | INVESTING | CAREERS | SMALL BUSINESS | TECHN
© Copyright 2003 Time Inc. All rights reserved. Reproduction in whole or in part without permission

Privacy Policy Terms of Use Disclaimer Contact Fortune
Subscribe to: Posts (Atom)
 
 
 
   
Simple template. Powered by Blogger.
 
 
Subscribe to: Posts (Atom)
 
 
 
   
Simple template. Powered by Blogger.
 
 
 
 

 
Comments
You do not have permission to add comments.
 
 
Follow

Get every new post delivered to your Inbox.